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Abstract 
Terrorism in the Sinai 
Robin Nicole Richards, MGlobalPolStuds; MA 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2014 
Supervisors:  Jeremi Suri and Jason Brownlee 
This report tracks and analyzes militant activity in the Sinai Peninsula. It focuses 
on the violence that has occurred since 2011, and particularly on the major increase in 
violence has been ongoing since July 2013. The project relies on open source intelligence 
to identify the reasons for the increase in violence and also determine the nature of the 
violence – who is carrying out the attacks and why. 
On July 3, 2013, the Egyptian military removed the democratically elected 
President Mohamed Morsi. What followed was an unprecedented increase in violence in 
the Sinai Peninsula. Since the fall of 2013, the violence has spread from the Sinai 
Peninsula into the mainland of Egypt. Hundreds of security personnel have been killed or 
injured since the uptick in the violence. After the coup that removed Morsi, there was a 
significant shift in the targets of attacks and the tactics used and this shift is indicative of 
the presence of the global jihadi network in the Sinai. Terrorist groups stopped targeting 
Israel and turned almost exclusively to Egypt security personnel. There has also been a 
vii 
major increase in suicide attacks, which indicates that there is a connection between the 
global jihadi network and Egyptian militant groups. 
The military is once again in control of Egypt’s government yet they have focused 
on consolidating political control instead of dealing with Egypt’s mounting security 
problem. The military has consistently insisted that the Muslim Brotherhood is behind the 
terror and ignored the true cause of the violence. This willful omission has allowed the 
terrorist groups in the Sinai to flourish and threaten security in mainland Egypt. 
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Note on Graphics 
All graphics were generated using DecisionGrid analytical software 
(www.decisiongrid.com), unless otherwise noted. All information contained within the 
graphics is based on information I collected and inputted into the software. Events, 
organizations and people were created within the software for analytical purposes.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
On July 3, 2013, as some protestors demanded the removal of Egyptian President 
Mohamed Morsi and others aggressively demonstrated on his behalf, one hopeful jihadi 
posted on an Internet forum.1 The anonymous author called on Egyptian Salafists to 
begin training and collecting weapons for a coming jihad.2 He recommended that hopeful 
militants seek refuge in the Sinai Peninsula.3 The author even hopefully called for the 
establishment of an Egyptian version of the Syrian al Qaeda affiliate.4 On the same day, 
the military forced Morsi out of office and a major terrorist outbreak in the Sinai began.  
Between July 2013 and November 2013, there were more than 250 reported 
violent attacks in the Sinai Peninsula.5 Although there has been an increase in violence in 
the Sinai since early 2011, the summer and fall of 2013 represent a major uptick in 
attacks: between January 25, 2011 and May 2012, security sources only reported 50 
violent attacks.6 The vast majority of these attacks targeted security personnel both at 
static installations such as checkpoints and police stations.  
The military initially blamed terrorists in the Gaza Strip for the attacks. They 
alleged Palestinian groups are behind the many of the attacks. As the violence 
progressed, however, they began to blame the Muslim Brotherhood for the violence, 
claiming that the group’s leadership was funding the attacks. The military cracked down 
                                                
1 Richards, “The al Qaeda Network Responds to Egypt,” 2013 
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Barnett, “Ansar Jerusalem: The war has yet to start,” 2013 
6 “Palestinian armed groups, al-Qaeda launched 50 attacks on Sinai police since Mubarak’s ouster,” 2012. 
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on the organization and launched an offensive to eliminate the violence in the peninsula. 
Until recently, security officials publically maintained that the militant problem would be 
taken care of “very soon.”7  
 
Figure 1:  Locations of Major Attacks Since 2011 
The attacks, however, have not just increased. There are not simply more of the 
same type of attacks that occurred between 2011 and the summer of 2013. There has been 
a shift in tactics and targets. Attacks have become much more complex, requiring more 
resources, planning, technical knowledge and careful timing. The changes in attacks are 
indicative of increased organization among the militants of the Sinai but are also signs of 
                                                
7 Barnett, “Egypt intel chief: Eradicating Sinai jihadist cells ‘could take some time,’” 2013 
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increased training and logistical support from an international terrorist network. The al 
Qaeda network has established a presence within the peninsula and provided support to 
the local militants. Sinai-based terrorist groups have shown an unprecedented connection 
to the global al Qaeda network. Understanding the nature of the violence in the Sinai is 
critical for developing an effective counterterrorism strategy.  The Egyptian military is 
performing counterterrorism operations as though they are fighting a domestic terrorist 
outbreak and not a manifestation of a global terrorist enterprise.  
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Chapter 2:  Literature on Terrorism 
 
Egypt has a long history of terrorism and is in many ways the birthplace of the 
global jihadi movement. Yet despite this, there is very little recent literature on terrorism 
in Egypt. The ongoing outbreak of terrorism is too recent to have produced much 
scholarship and in recent decades, terrorist attacks in Egypt have been limited – 
particularly in comparison to other terrorist “hotspots” like Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen and 
Somalia. It is, however, useful to explore more general theories of terrorism and apply 
them to the most recent Egyptian case of terrorism in the Sinai.   
DEFINING TERRORISM 
 
Scholars have proposed a number of competing definitions of terrorism. Defining 
terrorism is often a politically charged exercise. Although there are a number of differing 
definitions, there is a consensus on a few major aspects of terrorism. Terrorism is 
generally defined as violence or the threat of violence conducted for political reasons that 
effect a broader audience beyond the immediate target.8 This violence is carried out by an 
“identifiable organization” and by non-state actors.9  
Some definitions of terrorism distinguish between violence against civilians or 
security personnel.10 Violence against security personnel is often considered terrorism 
when the security personnel are not actively engaging in combat.11 Although there is 
                                                
8 Lutz, 9-10 
9 Ibid.  
10 Bjørgo, Tore, 2 
11 Ibid. 
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some disagreement among the scholars, terrorism for the purposes of this study includes 
attacks against security personnel. The attacks in the Sinai are typically against security 
personnel when they performing daily tasks – such as manning security checkpoints or 
moving through the area. These attacks are terrorist attacks not only because of the direct 
target, but because the broader purpose of the violence is to disrupt the security mission 
of the Egyptian military and government. When terrorists target one army convoy, the 
entire military is affected. The terrorists in the Sinai are attempting to create fear that 
forces the government to yield to their political objectives and cease military operations.  
CAUSES OF TERRORISM 
 
Most scholars have agreed that there is no single cause that can account for 
terrorism. However complex the answer might be, understanding the causes of a 
particular terrorist outbreak is critical to developing an effective counterterror strategy. 
One terrorism scholar, Tore Bjørgo proposed a four-level causal framework.12 
The broadest level is structural causes, which includes things like globalization and 
economic underdevelopment that affect populations in ways they may not even be 
aware.13 The next level contains the facilitator or accelerator causes. Causes in this level 
might be social media or ungoverned spaces that make it easier for terrorists to carry out 
attacks.14 The third level of causes is the motivational level.15 These are the personal 
                                                
12 Tore, 3-4 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid.  
 7 
factors that drive individuals to participate in terrorism like ideology and perceived 
economic inequality. Lastly, there are triggering causes that directly lead to a terrorist 
outbreak.  
This framework is a particularly useful way to analyze individual terrorist 
outbreaks. It allows for universal forces that may encourage terrorist activity in many 
places, but also for unique forces in particular areas.  
PERSONAL MOTIVATION FOR TERRORISM 
 
One of the most difficult to understand aspects of terrorism is at the individual 
level. Why would someone make a conscious decision to kill others? Why would 
someone take his own life in order to promote a distant political agenda? Although it is 
hard for many to fathom, researchers must take the motivations and decision making of 
the individuals who participate in terror seriously. Oftentimes, terrorists are written off as 
insane, desperate, or deluded. While this may be true in some cases, it is not a useful way 
in which to evaluate terror.  
The most recent terrorist outbreak in the Sinai Peninsula is an area where it is 
particularly useful to try and ascertain the personal motivations behind the terrorist 
activity. Unlike Iraq in the 2000s or in the Palestinian Territories, there is no obvious 
occupying force. Islamic fundamentalism is also an inadequate explanation for this 
terrorism. Additionally, an examination of the personal motivations behind the violence 
is necessary to explain why the major uptick in terrorist activity occurred in 2013 after 
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can also help explain why the violence, once localized in the Sinai Peninsula, has spread 
into mainland Egypt.  
Robert Pape’s 2005 study of suicide terrorism, Dying to Win, provides an in-depth 
study of the history of suicide terrorism. He argues that Islamic fundamentalism is 
inadequate to explain suicide terrorism; instead, suicide terrorism is most likely where 
there is a foreign occupying force.16 Other scholars have identified a number of diverse 
motivations behind suicide terrorism: social status, personal significance, lack of 
alternative prospects, displacement, moral obligation, status, humiliation and injustice, 
and vengeance.17 Kruglanski et al. argues that while these motivating factors are useful, 
they may result in different responses in different situations.18 Many, if not all of these 
factors are at play in the Sinai Peninsula, where decades of government discrimination 
has marginalized the population.   
                                                
16 Pape 4 
17 Kruglanski et al., 332 
18 Ibid. 334 
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Chapter 3:  Methodology 
 
Policy makers must understand the nature of the threat to develop an effective 
counterterror strategy. Because the Egyptian military has political incentives to 
misrepresent the nature of the terrorist outbreak, scholars must conduct an independent 
investigation into the causes and driving factors of the activity in the Sinai Peninsula.  
The shadowy nature of terrorist groups does not lend itself to conventional 
research methods. First-hand acquisitions such as surveys and interviews are largely out 
of the question. Additionally, the developments are too recent to rely on secondary source 
material or archives – even if they existed. This paper is therefore based on an analysis of 
open-source intelligence. This refers to any information available without a security 
clearance.  
In this instance, I have used news articles that report the occurrence of various 
attacks and relevant incidents. I have also used the statements released by the groups 
within the Sinai. The collection of these sources creates an accurate picture of the trends 
of the terrorist outbreak. I have imported the source material into analytic database 
software.19 I have coded the attacks to show difference in tactics (shooting or bombing) 
and targets (police or military, civilian and static or moving). I have also used the 
software to generate maps, timelines and network diagrams that assist in my analysis.  
                                                
19 The software used is DecisionGrid. For more, see www.decisiongrid.com. 
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Figure 2:  Sample Event 
The software has allowed me to collect and store the relevant data and then 
analyze it for important trends. Although the data I collected cannot be taken to represent 
every single terrorist attack in the peninsula since January 2011, it does show useful 
changes in terrorist activities and the attacks of greatest significance.   
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Chapter 4:  The Sinai Peninsula 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Map of the Sinai 
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The Sinai Peninsula is a mountainous, desert area situated between Egypt and 
Israel. It is large – about 23,500 square miles – and sparsely populated.20 The triangular 
peninsula acts as the only land bridge between Africa and Asia. The Suez Canal, a critical 
shipping lane, lies on the western edge of the peninsula, while the Gaza Strip and Israel 
border on the east. The mountains within the peninsula contain the country’s highest 
peak, Mount Sinai. Although the mountains are not particularly high by global standards, 
they distinguish Sinai from the relatively flat mainland. 
 
Figure 4:  Satellite View of the Sinai 
                                                
20 “Sinai Peninsula,” 2009 
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Satellite imagery shows the stark contrast between the sparse desert of the Sinai and the 
fertile, more densely populated Nile Delta.  Source: Google Maps 
 
Today, the peninsula has a population roughly 600,000.21 About one-third of the 
population belongs to one of fifteen Bedouin tribes.22 Most of the population lives in the 
northern edge of the peninsula, along the Mediterranean, or along the western coast.23  In 
Northern Sinai, the Sawarka and Tarabin are the largest tribes while the Muszeina tribe is 
the largest in the South.24 The various tribes have loose but long-standing territorial 
boundaries. Tourism and government development in the peninsula complicated the 
tribes’ holdings and they have struggled to maintain their semi-nomadic way of life.  
Prior to 1956, the Egyptian government largely ignored the peninsula, effectively 
allowing the Bedouin to administer the territory.25  However, following the Suez Crisis in 
1956, the Egyptian government attempted to develop the peninsula.26 They built a road 
connecting the eastern coast city of Sharm al Sheikh with Suez and mines to access 
minerals and petroleum.27 Although this could have been an opportunity for the Bedouin 
to achieve increased employment, most of the jobs associated with development went to 
workers from Sudan and mainland Egypt.28 Instead, many Bedouin turned to narcotics 
smuggling, a nuisance Egypt was unable to effectively combat.29  
                                                
21 Kovac “Armed Groups in the Sinai Peninsula,” 2013 
22 Balanga, “Sinai: A Territory Without a Master,” 2012 
23 Kovac “Armed Groups in the Sinai Peninsula,” 2013 
24 Ibid. 
25 Lavie, 1984, 35 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid. 36 
29 Ibid.  
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Following the 1967 war with Israel, Egypt lost control of the peninsula to Israel, 
who occupied the territory for more than a decade.30 Unlike the Egyptian government, 
who relied upon sheikhs as intermediaries to the Bedouin, the Israelis worked directly 
with the local tribes.31  The Israeli government sought to understand Bedouin tribal 
structure and provided social services, such as food and medical aid.32 During their 
occupation of the peninsula, Israeli civilians settled parts of the peninsula, namely in St. 
Catherine’s Monastery and Sharm al Sheikh.33 They also focused on developing a tourist 
industry in the area.34 Although there were some improvements in the quality of life in 
the Sinai during Israeli occupation, Bedouin still defined themselves in contrast to “the 
Jews.”35 Although historically not particularly devout Muslims, the occupation triggered 
a sort of Islamic revival amongst the Bedouin.36  
As part of the 1978 Camp David Accords, Israel agreed to return the Sinai 
Peninsula to Egypt.37 The “Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty  between 
Egypt and Israel” provided for the interim withdrawal of Israeli forces, the stationing of 
United Nations forces and the deployment of no more than one division of Egyptian 
forces in the westernmost part of the peninsula.38 The 1979 treaty between Israel and 
Egypt divided the Sinai into Zones A, B, and C, with different levels of Egyptian military 
                                                
30 Kovac “Armed Groups in the Sinai Peninsula,” 2013 
31 Ibid. 36 
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid. 37 
34 Ibid. 38 
35 Ibid. 40 
36 Ibid.  
37 “Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel” 
38 Ibid.  
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force allowed in each: one division was allowed in Zone A, the westernmost zone, no 
more than four thousand border guards would be allowed in the middle zone, Zone B, 
while only police forces were permitted in Zone C, which borders Israel.39  Egypt’s use 
of its aircraft and naval forces were also restricted across the peninsula.40 Although the 
parties initially hoped to have a UN peacekeeping force, the UN was unable to provide 
one. Instead, they created the Multinational Force and Observers, still active in Zone C 
today.41  
                                                
39 “MFO Origins” 
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid.  
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Figure 5:  Map of Zones of Sinai 
Source: Multinational Force and Observers 
 
Under the 1979 peace treaty, the Sinai became a buffer zone between Egypt and 
Israel, and life did not improve for the Bedouin.42 The Mubarak regime socially and 
economically oppressed this semi-nomadic population for decades. In 1982, the 
government encouraged Egyptians from the Nile Delta to migrate to the peninsula and as 
                                                
42 Laub, “Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and Security,” 2013 
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a result, many Bedouin were removed from their traditional lands.43 Under Mubarak, they 
were not allowed to serve in the military or government.44 There has been very limited 
economic development in the area; most of the development has been focused on tourist 
resorts along the Red Sea.45 However, the vast majority of the jobs associated with the 
tourist industry were given to Egyptians from elsewhere in Egypt and not to locals.46 Half 
of the Bedouin population reportedly lives in poverty.47 Furthermore, the Sinai is isolated 
from mainland Egypt; only two roads link the area to the rest of the country.  
In 2006, Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics reported 
that more than half of population of North Sinai was unemployed48 while Egypt as a 
whole had an unemployment rate of 8.3%.49 As a result of the limited economic 
opportunity, much of the population resorted to smuggling things like drugs, cigarettes 
and weapons across the border.50 Under Morsi, smuggling flourished, but that changed 
dramatically once the military came to power.51 The military has moved to shut down the 
smuggling tunnels in an attempt to improve the security situation but as a result there is 
very little economic opportunity in the peninsula.  
                                                
43 Balanga, “Sinai: A Territory Without a Master,” 2012 
44 “Egypt: Bedouins begin to demand equal citizenship rights,” 2013 
45 Pfeffer, “The key to restoring Sinai security,” 2013 
46 Ibid.  
47 Gerges, “Egypt’s Sinai problem won’t be solved with air strikes,” 2012 
48 “Egypt’s revolution brings little to underdeveloped Sinai,” 2013 
49 Assaad, 2007 
50 Ibid.  
51 Aziz, “Sinai’s Role in Morsi’s Ouster,” 2013 
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Because of the limited military presence in the Sinai, security was left to the 
police and the Mukhabarat.52  The military therefore had limited experience within the 
Sinai while the police were left to “scare the population with sheer brutality.”53 During 
the Sinai resort bombings of 2004-2006, police forces arrested thousands of Bedouin and 
imprisoned them “without evidence or reason.”54 Following the January 25 revolution, 
the police presence in the peninsula dropped dramatically.55  The absence of the police 
force “allowed the Bedouin population of Sinai – as well as Sinai-based Salafi-jihadis – 
to exact revenge for years of perceived ill-treatment by the police and state.”56 
One key to the terrorist outbreak in the Sinai is understanding the relationship 
between the local population and the government. According to one report:  
The security problems emanating from the Sinai must be viewed, first, 
from a human angle. While Sinai’s harsh and sparsely populated terrain 
provide a vast hiding space for violent jihadis and criminal elements, the 
Egyptian state’s treatment of the region’s Bedouin population breeds a 
contempt for the state, of which these elements have long taken 
advantage.57 
 
Sinai-based Bedouins and the Egyptian government have no history of a positive 
relationship.  Egyptian government policies created an environment that isolated, 
marginalized and discriminated against the population of the Sinai. The residents of the 
Sinai may not see the Egyptian government as a legitimate governing body. The return of 
the military to the head of the political government in July 2013 may have provided both 
                                                
52 Pfeffer 2013 
53 Gold 2013 
54 Ibid.  
55 Pfeffer 2013 
56 Gold 2013 
57 Gold, “Sinai Security,” 2013 
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the opening and the impetus to mobilize a larger portion of the population to commit acts 
of violence.   
  
 20 
Chapter 5:  Sinai-based Terrorism Since July 2013 
POLITICAL CHANGES, MILITANT OPENING 
 
The popular protests that occurred in Egypt in January and February of 2011 were 
unprecedented. Tens of thousands of Egyptians poured into Tahrir Square in Cairo and 
other city centers around the country to demand political change. They got what they – 
and global leaders – asked for. The Egyptian military pushed Hosni Mubarak, who had 
been president of the country for thirty years, out of his office after eighteen days of 
popular protests. Following Mubarak’s resignation on February 11, observers and 
Egyptians alike were optimistic about the prospects for the country’s future. There was, 
however, something else that occurred on February 11 in another corner of the country 
that would foreshadow the coming turmoil.  
In the North Sinai city of al Arish, hundreds attacked a police station.58 They 
threw gasoline bombs at the building in an attempt to free prisoners.59 Once the smoke 
had cleared, five were dead, including three police officers, and forty-two were injured.60 
The clash had partially destroyed the police station and five police vehicles.61 Some of 
the prisoners being held in the station were able to escape.62 The clash in the small city 
was largely overlooked in the bigger news of the day. It was, however, just the beginning 
of the upheaval and violence that would grow and eventually explode in the Sinai 
Peninsula.  
                                                
58 Hammond, “Police and protestors clash in Egypt’s Sinai, 5 dead,” 2011 
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid.  
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid.  
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Before the popular revolt had run its course, the military sought approval from 
Israel to deploy two battalions – roughly 800 troops – to the Sinai.63 Israel approved the 
request on January 31; this was the first time Egyptian troops entered the easternmost 
section of the peninsula since the conclusion of the 1979 peace treaty.64 The battalions, 
however, went to the southern resort town of Sharm al Sheikh and not the northern part 
of the peninsula where most of the population lives.65 This small military presence in the 
southernmost tip of the country could not have possibly prevented a security vacuum 
from developing.  
                                                
63 Sobelman, “Egypt and Israel,” 2011 
64 Ibid.  
65 Ibid.  
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Figure 6:  Timeline of Major Attacks in 2011  
 23 
Attacks in the peninsula began even before Mubarak resigned. The first attack 
would come to be very common between 2011 and mid-2013 – a bombing of the gas 
pipeline to Israel and Jordan.66 There would be at least seven more attacks and attempted 
attacks of the Arish-Ashkelon pipeline in 2011 alone. 
 The pipeline became a major target because of its controversial nature. The 
pipeline supplies forty percent of Israel’s natural gas.67 The export prices were fixed as 
part of a twenty-year deal struck during the Mubarak regime.68 Many objected to the deal 
on the grounds that the set price was below market rate and argued that the Egyptian 
people were not benefiting from the deal.69 While many of the attacks were not attributed 
to anyone in particular, one militant group would later claim responsibility for at least 
thirteen attempts to sabotage the pipeline.  
Ansar Beit al Maqdis, or as they are more commonly known, Ansar Jerusalem is a 
militant group that operates primarily in the North Sinai area. The group announced their 
existence in a video released on jihadi forums on July 24, 2012.70 Their name means 
“Supporters of Jerusalem” and the video states that the group “‘was established after al 
Qaeda leader Sheikh Ayman al Zawahiri called for a cessation of the transfer of gas to the 
State of Israel.”71 The group reported they had bombed the Arish-Ashkelon gas pipeline 
                                                
66 Edmund,  “Saboteurs attack Egypt-Israel gas pipeline,” 2011 
67 Ibid. 
68 “Blasts hit gas pipeline between Egypt, Jordan, and Israel,” 2011 
69 Ibid.  
70  Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group, July 2012 
71 Ibid.  
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numerous times dating back to 2011.72 In the video, the group spokesman claimed that 
the deal to export gas to Israel constitutes treason and harms the Egyptian people.73 The 
video contains footage of militants attacking the pipeline in the first documentation of the 
sabotage.74 
 Ansar Jerusalem targeted the Arish-Ashkelon pipeline primarily to target Israel 
and they carried out other attacks in order to cause more damage. In another statement 
published in September 2012, the group claimed responsibility for two cross-border 
attacks on Israel. The first attack occurred more than a year prior, on August 18, 2011 
when armed men launched a multi-stage attack in southern Israel.75 This complex attack 
involved several teams of militants first targeting a tour bus and then bombing first 
responders. The attack left eight Israelis dead and many civilians wounded.76 This was 
reportedly the worst terrorist attack Israel had suffered since 2008.77 In the statement, 
they also claimed responsibility for a September 2012 attack on Israeli forces that 
resulted in the death of one soldier.78 They claimed this attack was retribution for the 
recent film portraying the prophet Muhammad in a negative light.79 These major attacks 
and the sabotage of the pipeline to Israel constitute a distinct attack signature for Ansar 
Jerusalem during this time. Their primary focus was on harming Israel both economically 
                                                
72 Ibid.  
73 Ibid.  
74 Ibid.  
75 Bruer, “Militants kill 8 in complex assault on Israeli civilians,” 2011 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Roggio, “Ansar Jerusalem claims attack on Israeli troops in the Sinai,” 2012 
79 Ibid.  
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and by harming its military and civilians. Their tactics mostly consisted of raids and 
bombings and were not highly sophisticated methods.  
It is not clear where Ansar Jerusalem derived its support during the period from 
2011 until July 2013. Based on their chosen target of Israel, it is possible they received 
some sort of support from Palestinian terrorist groups. During this time, they did not 
claim attacks on Egyptian civilians or security personnel and their primary goal appears 
to be to harm Israel. A shift in their tactics and targets in July 2013, however, would 
come to be indicative of a shift in their support network.   
 26 
Figure 7:  Major Attacks in the Sinai, July 2013 
Highlighted attacks, including a sniper attack and a suicide car bomb, indicate 
increasingly sophisticated tactics. 
 
 
 27 
THE COUP 
 
On June 30, 2013, thousands of Egyptians staged protests to demand the 
resignation of President Morsi.80 It was the one-year anniversary of his election to office, 
the first democratic presidential election in Egypt’s history. Deteriorating economic 
conditions and the perceived failure of the Morsi administration outraged the anti-Morsi 
protestors and drove them to the street. The protests turned violent as Morsi supporters 
launched opposing demonstrations.81 As the demonstrations entered their second day on 
July 1, six were dead and more than 600 wounded.82 Later that day, the army issued an 
ultimatum to Morsi: resolve the crisis and end the demonstrations within 48 hours or the 
military would intervene.83 In their public statement, the army attempted to position itself 
as neutral, but dubbed the protests “glorious.”84 As protests continued, Morsi demanded 
that the army take back its ultimatum, but failed to resolve the crisis.85 On July 3, the 
military placed Morsi and his aides under house arrest, bringing an end to his 
presidency.86  
Reactions within Egypt were split between jubilance and anger. Anti-Morsi 
protesters went home, their mission accomplished, but pro-Morsi protests intensified. 
Hundreds of thousands of supporters poured into the streets. The official response from 
the Brotherhood was outrage. They immediately denounced the actions of the military as 
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a coup and said they would “refuse to participate in any action with the usurpers.”87 A 
few days later, they called for an uprising “against those who would ‘steal their revolt 
with tanks and massacres.’”88 Morsi supporters remained on the streets but the military 
repressed their action, often with deadly force. Forces fired on protesters on July 8, 
killing 42 and wounding more than 300.89 
Al Qaeda and its affiliates expressed similar outrage, in a rare moment of 
agreement with the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite previous critiques of the Morsi 
administration (Ayman al Zawahiri had previously lambasted the new constitution), al 
Qaeda members wasted no time in condemning the actions of the military.90 Associated 
groups released statements via social media outlets, pointing out the failure of democracy 
and the futility of the elections.91 Groups in North Africa, Kenya and Somalia called for 
the Egyptian people to rise up and wage jihad.92 The message was clear: violence is the 
only way to bring about a “proper” Islamic government.  
Terrorist attacks in the Sinai escalated immediately. Meanwhile, violent protests 
were staged across the country as the Brotherhood took to the streets.  
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MORE POLITICAL INSTABILITY, MORE VIOLENCE 
 
  Following Morsi’s ouster, violence increased dramatically from attacks every 
week or so to multiple attacks per day in the Sinai Peninsula. The attackers, unlike the 
Islamist protesters encamped in Cairo, were not demanding the return of Morsi but were 
instead killing security personnel in the peninsula.  
At first, many of the attacks in July 2013 were consistent with the anarchy that 
was prevalent throughout Egypt. Most of the attacks were shootings that targeted security 
personnel. Gunmen would open fire on a particular security installation, usually a 
checkpoint or a police station, and then escape on vehicles. Attacks such as these could 
have been carried out by almost anyone for almost any purpose. There were, however, 
two notable attacks that indicate a much higher level of sophistication. In al Arish, the 
capital of the North Sinai Governorate, a sniper killed three police officers on July 21 in 
the first of such attacks reported in the area.93 The police were guarding three separate 
buildings in the city – an administrative building, a television station and a police 
station.94 This was a coordinated attack95 that required significant knowledge and skills. 
The use of a sniper rifle requires specialized training, not to mention the acquisition of a 
specialized weapon.  
There has also been a significant shift in targets since early July. There have been 
surprisingly few cross-border attacks targeting Israel; the vast majority of attacks have 
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been against Egyptian security personnel. From September 2013 until December 2013, 
there were no major, reported attacks on Israel launched from the Sinai Peninsula. This is 
in stark contrast to the preceding two years, where Israeli resorts and security personnel 
were frequently targeted. During these months, terrorist attacks turned inward and 
focused not on the pipeline or Israel, but on Egyptian security personnel.   
 31 
 
 
Figure 8: Major Attacks in the Sinai, September 2013 
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Figure 9: Major Attacks in the Sinai, October 2013 
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Figure 10: Major Attacks in the Sinai, November 2013 
On July 24, a suicide car bomber (SVBIED or suicide vehicle-borne improvised 
explosive device) attempted to target a police station in al Arish.96 This was the first 
known suicide attack in Egypt since 2011. Suicide attacks in the country are historically 
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rare; there were six suicide attacks in the thirty years between 1981 and 201197 but six 
suicide attacks in the five months following Morsi’s ousting. There were no casualties in 
this attack apart from the four suicide bombers in the vehicle.98 It appears that there may 
have been a munitions failure before the bombers reached their destination and the 
explosives detonated in a desert area.99 It was an attempt at a complicated attack; 
unfortunately there would be more successful attacks in the coming months.  
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Figure 11:  Suicide Attacks and Related Events, July 2013-Nov. 2013 
Suicide attacks denoted in red. 
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Ansar Jerusalem has claimed responsibility for at least two of the suicide attacks, 
but is likely tied to, or has carried out, some of the others. Another group, Jund al Islam, 
carried out a coordinated dual-suicide bombing on two targets in September 2013.100 The 
increase in suicide attacks represents the development of a tactic largely foreign to Egypt. 
These suicide bombings all follow the same signature: a suicide bomber drives an 
explosives-laden vehicle next to (or in to) the target. These SVBIEDs have been 
uncommon in Egypt, but suicide tactics are common among the al Qaeda network. 
SVBIEDs are also much more sophisticated attacks than shootings. The nature of the 
attack requires knowledge of bomb making and the ability to move through military 
checkpoints in order to avoid being detected on the way to the target.  
Ansar Jerusalem epitomizes the changes in tactics and target that are reflected in 
the general trends in the peninsula. These changes indicate a connection to the global al 
Qaeda network. In the last few months, Ansar Jerusalem has not claimed responsibility 
for any attacks on Israel and instead have almost exclusively targeted Egyptian security 
personnel.  
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Chapter 6:  Who Is and Who Is Not Behind the Terror 
EGYPTIAN MILITARY CLAIMS ABOUT SINAI TERRORISM 
 
 The Egyptian military and other government officials have made a number of 
claims about the causes of the recent outbreak of terrorism in the Sinai. However, these 
accusations are contradictory to the statements made by Israeli intelligence and other 
observers. It seems likely they are making particular claims for political objectives and 
ignoring – at least publically – the true driving forces behind the violence.  
 The military insisted during the fall of 2013 that militants from Gaza were 
carrying out the terrorist attacks. In a September 2013 interview, the Egyptian Foreign 
Minister, Nabil Fahmy claimed that Gazan militants had worked with militants based in 
North Sinai to carry out joint-attacks.101  The minister called on Hamas to do more to 
secure the Gazan border but did not directly accuse Hamas of carrying out attacks.102 
However, in a previous press conference, a military official claimed the military had 
found grenades stamped with the logo of Hamas’ military wing.103 State-run TV also 
alleged in September 2013 that Hamas trained the terrorist groups who had carried out 
recent attacks.104 The state-run paper Al Ahram also reported that Hamas had been 
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“involved” in the attempted assassination of the interior minister.105 These allegations 
have been consistently denied by Hamas.106 
The military is not just saying that Hamas is behind the attacks; they have acted 
on these accusations. Since removing Morsi from office, they have destroyed hundreds of 
smuggling tunnels between the Gaza strip and the Sinai Peninsula.107 Only a few tunnels 
remain. These tunnels provided an “economic lifeline” to Gaza,108 but also provided 
economic opportunities for residents of the Sinai. The military has claimed that militants 
were using the tunnels to carry out attacks on security forces.109  
The military has also pointed fingers at the now-disbanded Muslim Brotherhood. 
During a November 23 press conference, Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim alleged that 
the Muslim Brotherhood had drawn on its international finances to mobilize “‘a number 
of terrorist extremist elements…and spurred them to carry out villainous terrorist 
attacks.’”110 He claimed the government had “found documents, seized weapons, and 
foiled various attack attempts against public figures, police and army personnel.”111 
Ibrahim’s evidence, however, is thin at best. The Muslim Brotherhood has consistently 
denied participating in the violence.112 Other groups, however, have adopted 
responsibility for the attacks and praised them. The Muslim Brotherhood has little to lose 
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from claiming responsibility for supporting a “war” against the military. On the other 
hand the military has everything to gain from exaggerating or fabricating their 
accusations. If they can convince the population and the international community that the 
Muslim Brotherhood is behind the terrorist attacks, the military can eradicate their largest 
political rival with few objections.  
THE BROTHERHOOD 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood is not well understood. Its goals and ideology are often 
conflated with that of al Qaeda.   However, despite a shared desire to implement Islamic 
law, the groups have little in common. The Brotherhood is first and foremost a political 
organization, committed to working within the system instead of violently destroying it 
from the outside. The Brotherhood does not officially condone violence. Al Qaeda has 
argued that elections are un-Islamic by nature and are unable to bring about Islamic 
governance.  Violence, of course, is their preferred method to “fix” the government. The 
current emir of al Qaeda, Ayman al Zawahiri, left the Brotherhood in the 1990s and 
joined the violent Egyptian Islamic Jihad.113  
Hassan al Banna, a young teacher, founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928.114 
The organization began as a religious and social organization but after ten years, the 
group’s founder announced the Brotherhood’s entry into politics.115 Four years later, in 
1942, the group attempted to participate in its first national elections as an opposition 
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group.116 The government, still a monarchy at the time, objected to the Brotherhood’s 
participation.117 Al Banna struck a deal with government to allow the Brotherhood more 
freedom in its operations in exchange for withdrawing from the elections.118 The Muslim 
Brotherhood continued to clash with the government and was banned in 1948. 119  
During the 1952 Free Officers revolution, the Brotherhood teamed up with the 
military.120 Their alliance, however, did not last and the group was banned once again in 
1954, after they were accused of staging an assassination attempt on President Gamal 
Abd al Nasser.121 This marked the beginning of a violent phase in the Brotherhood’s 
history while Sayyid Qutb, often cited as the ideological founder of Salafi Jihadi 
movements, led the organization.122  
At the demand of Anwar Sadat, the Brotherhood renounced violence in the 
1970s.123 Although still technically illegal, the group’s members returned to politics and 
participated in parliamentary elections as independent candidates in 1984. The 
Brotherhood continued to work within the political system as an opposition group into 
the 2000s. Their greatest success during the Mubarak regime came in 2005, when they 
won eighty-eight seats in parliament.124 By the end of the Mubarak regime in 2011, the 
Brotherhood was the largest and best-organized political opposition group in the 
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country.125 The Brotherhood achieved this position while being illegal, although 
tolerated. The organization had an extensive grassroots organization to draw upon and a 
history of working with communities across the country. They were in a prime position to 
take control of the new government. They were able to take control of the new post-
revolution parliament and eventually the presidency.  
On July 3, 2013, the military began systematically crippling the Brotherhood. 
After installing an interim president, the military has worked to exclude the Brotherhood 
from the political scene. In addition to President Morsi, six other high-ranking MB 
officials were arrested on July 3: the head of the organization’s political party, the Deputy 
Supreme Guide and four of Morsi’s top aides. 126 The military continued to arrest leaders 
in the MB, including the Supreme Guide on August 20.127 They arrested more than one 
hundred leaders in the organization between July 3 and September 17.128 While the 
military primarily targeted the leadership, they police reportedly had orders to arrest 300 
members in all. 129 At the same time, the government shut down a Brotherhood television 
station.130   
While arresting MB members, the government also seized the assets of the 
organization, its members and any associated organizations. On September 23, a court 
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issued a ruling banning the Brotherhood and ordering its assets seized.131 This ruling 
affecting not just the Brotherhood itself but also organizations associated with it such as 
its political party and non-governmental organization.132 On December 31, the courts 
went further, seizing the personal assets of more than 500 members of the 
Brotherhood.133 The list of members included group leaders already arrested, such as 
Mohamed Morsi and family members of leaders.134  
At the time of the September 23 ruling, al Jazeera reported that “most senior 
members [of the Brotherhood] are in prison or on the run.”135 Since then, the situation for 
the Brotherhood has only gotten worse, with more and more of its leaders and lower level 
members getting arrested or killed. More than 1,000 members have reportedly been killed 
during protests in support of the Brotherhood.136 Remaining members have been driven 
underground and are attempting to regroup in hiding.137  
On December 25, the government designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a 
terrorist group.138 The government accused the Brotherhood of being behind the 
December 24 attack on a security building in Mansoura, where a suicide bombing killed 
16 people and wounded more than 100. Despite the fact that Ansar Jerusalem claimed 
responsibility for the bombing, the government stubbornly pointed the finger at the 
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MB.139 The government can now arrest anyone who belongs to the Brotherhood, provides 
financial support or promotes it on charges of belonging to a terrorist group.140 
The Egyptian government has argued that the Brotherhood is ultimately behind 
the outbreak of terrorism in the Sinai. Although there have been some arrests of 
Brotherhood members in relation to specific terror attacks, the evidence to support the 
military’s assertion is thin. Officials have not released any evidence that the Brotherhood 
is linked to the Mansoura bombing, despite using the attack as the prime rationale for 
designating the group as a terrorist organization.141 What little evidence has been 
uncovered does not necessarily support the government’s argument: 
• On September 9, the former leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad claimed that the 
Muslim Brotherhood was funding Ansar Jerusalem as part of a deal mediated by 
Mohamed al Zawahiri, brother of the emir of al Qaeda.142 The former leader did 
not present any concrete evidence and could have had political reasons for making 
such a statement.  
• On October 15, security forces arrested a “supporter” of Morsi who was allegedly 
involved in an October 7 attack on a state satellite station in Cairo. However, 
“supporting” Morsi does not necessarily equate with being a member of the 
Brotherhood. Even if this person was a card-carrying member of the Brotherhood, 
his actions were not necessarily official actions of the organization.  
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• On December 10, two Muslim Brotherhood members were arrested in North Sinai 
on charges of inciting and financing terrorism.143 The government only released 
the initials of the men who were arrested so it is difficult to assess the veracity of 
the claim, namely whether or not they were actually Brotherhood members. 
Furthermore, the government did not offer an explanation of how these two men 
were “inciting” terrorism.  
• On December 30, a former leader in the Muslim Brotherhood claimed that Ansar 
Jerusalem and another Sinai terrorist group, the al Furqan Brigades, were 
branches of the Muslim Brotherhood.144 This statement is particularly 
problematic. The man who made it is Tharwat al Kherbawy, a lawyer who may 
have been forced out of the organization and has published a book “exposing the 
secrets” of the MB.145 This does not automatically mean his statement should be 
discounted, but it is difficult to accept it as true without additional supporting 
evidence.  
It is nearly impossible to say conclusively whether or not the Muslim Brotherhood 
is fueling the terrorist outbreak, however it is notable that there is an absence of reliable 
evidence that ties the Brotherhood to the terrorist groups. The military crackdown has 
severely reduced the ability of the organization to function. With more than one hundred 
high-ranking Brotherhood officials in jail, including the Supreme Guide and important 
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political figures, it is unlikely that the Brotherhood has the organizational capacity to 
support terrorist attacks. They also have a limited ability to finance any terror – the 
organization’s assets have been frozen since September 2013 and personal assets have 
been under scrutiny as well.  
There may be some radical individual elements within or tied to the Muslim 
Brotherhood that are also involved in recent terrorist attacks. However, because of the 
way in which the military has crippled the Brotherhood, it is unlikely that the 
organization as a whole is sponsoring terror.  
ANSAR JERUSALEM 
 
 In a short time, Ansar Jerusalem launched itself from a relatively obscure militant 
group conducting sporadic bombings of the natural gas pipeline to a major security threat 
across Egypt. Although there are not many details known about the group, their mission 
and support base can be ascertained from the attacks they have carried out and the 
statements they have made.  
Analysts report that Ansar Jerusalem’s membership is drawn primarily from Sinai 
Bedouin. Their initial base of operations was in the north of the Sinai Peninsula. The 
army has targeted their strongholds in the village of al Mahdiya, outside of Rafah.146 A 
great deal of militant activity has also been localized in the city of al Arish and the village 
of Sheikh Zuweid. During the winter of 2013-2014, the group established a base of 
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operations in mainland Egypt. They are carrying out more and more attacks in Cairo and 
the Nile Delta.  
 
Figure 12:  Map of Known Ansar Jerusalem Attacks 
One of the first clues as to the make up of the membership of the group came in 
August 2013. Ansar Jerusalem attempted an attack on Israel August 9, 2013.147 During 
this attack, a team of five terrorists attempted to launch rockets over the border into 
Israel.148 Four of the five terrorists were killed in an alleged “drone” strike on their 
position.149 A few days later, the group released a statement claiming responsibility for 
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the attempted attack and eulogizing its members who were killed.150 The statement 
identified the four members killed: one was from the Tiyaaha tribe and the remaining 
three were from the Sawarka tribe.151 A few months later, it was reported that there was 
also a cell leader with the four men at the time of the attack, also from the Sawarka tribe 
and related to two of those killed, Shadi al Menai.152 Al Menai has been identified as the 
“group’s leader,” but it is unclear if he is the leader or a leader of the group.153  
As of March 2014, Ansar Jerusalem has identified 19 deceased members by 
name.154 One of the latest eulogized members was Tawfiq Mohammed Freij.155 Ansar 
Jerusalem referred to Freij as a “founder” of the organization. Neither Ansar Jerusalem 
nor the Egyptian government has identified Freij’s nationality, but the group has 
previously reported that Egyptians founded it.156 Ansar Jerusalem also reported that Freij 
was tied to terrorist leaders who were active during the tourist bombings in Sinai in the 
2000s.157 Freij was reportedly intimately involved in some of the group’s most important 
attacks, including the September 2013 assassination attempt on the Egyptian Interior 
Minister (see below).  
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Ansar Jerusalem appears to draw most of its members from natives of the Sinai 
Peninsula but also elsewhere in Egypt. The group operates at the nexus between more 
longstanding radical jihadis and people local to the Sinai.  
Between July 2013 and January 2014, Ansar Jerusalem carried out several 
complicated attacks outside of their base of operations against high-level targets. On 
September 5, an SVBIED targeted the Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim outside his 
home in Cairo.158 The minister survived the attack, but the bomb was large enough to 
cause significant damage and injure more than twenty bystanders.159 A few days later, the 
group published a statement claiming responsibility for the attack.160 In the statement, 
they apologized for failing to kill their target and stated that their goal was to “break the 
security system” by killing Ibrahim.161 They also echoed previous calls from across the al 
Qaeda network, condemning democracy and calling for the establishment of “the religion 
of Allah.”162 
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Figure 13:  Attacks Carried Out by Ansar Jerusalem,  Jan. 2011 to Dec. 2013 
The significance of this attack cannot be overstated. Ansar Jerusalem carried out a 
major attack well outside their base of operations in North Sinai. This required moving 
men and materials through numerous military checkpoints and into the capital city. This 
attack also required a high level of information and skills. They had to successfully set up 
 50 
the explosives in the car and be able to get the vehicle to the home of the interior 
minister. They were able to time the explosion such that the bomb detonated as the 
minister left his house. This attack represents a dramatic increase in the capacity of the 
organization from the previous months. This increase in capacity is the result of increased 
resources and knowledge Ansar Jerusalem acquired from the jihadi network operating 
outside of Egypt.  
 Since that assassination attempt, Ansar Jerusalem has carried out several more 
major attacks outside of North Sinai. On October 7, the group carried out another 
SVBIED attack, this time targeting the headquarters of the South Sinai Security 
Directorate in al Tor.163 The attack killed three people and wounded about fifty.164 Later 
that month, on October 19, the group carried out a car bombing in Ismailiya targeting a 
military compound.165 Six were wounded in the attack.166 On November 17, the group 
carried out another attack in Cairo. This time they shot and killed an Interior Ministry 
official.167 The victim, Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Mabruk, was responsible for 
conducting investigations against the Muslim Brotherhood.168 Ansar Jerusalem targeted 
him because of his involvement in the arrest of twenty-two women at a pro-Morsi 
protest.169 The group reported that a cell local to Cairo, the Muatassim Billah Brigade, 
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carried out the attack.170 Ansar Jerusalem is not just getting better at carrying out 
complicated attacks, but is also spreading into mainland Egypt.  
There was a definite shift in the nature of Ansar Jerusalem following the coup that 
removed Morsi from office. Their target changed from Israel to Egyptian security 
personnel and their tactics became more complex. These changes are indicative of an 
influx of assistance from the global jihadi network. The group has received training and 
financial support from an outside group. The Egyptian government has blamed Hamas 
and accused them of training the local terrorist groups. However, if Hamas were 
supporting the terrorist groups, it seems unlikely that there would have been such a 
dramatic shift away from targeting Israel. A connection to the al Qaeda network is most 
likely.  
 Ansar Jerusalem’s last known attempted direct attack on Israel was the August 9, 
2013 attempt to fire rockets across the border.171 The group hosted a very public funeral 
for the four Bedouin tribesmen killed after Israel retaliated.172 Notably, the funeral for the 
four dead members featured al Qaeda flags draped over the coffins.173 Of course, it is 
easy enough to acquire a particular flag, but the presence of those flags in conjunction 
with the subsequent changes in tactics and targets of Ansar Jerusalem suggests a stronger 
connection between the group and the al Qaeda network.  
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Ansar Jerusalem has also publically stated that they would be using an al Qaeda 
media outlet to release their statements.174 They announced on October 21 that the group 
would not use any social media outlets to release statements and would instead only use 
al-Fajr Media Center.175This media outlet distributes al Qaeda productions on the Internet 
and reportedly maintains communication among the various al Qaeda affiliates.176 The 
increased capability of the organization and the groups own statements indicate that they 
are in fact connected to the al Qaeda network.  
AL QAEDA AND AL QAEDA IN THE SINAI PENINSULA 
 
The al Qaeda network today looks very different from when it catapulted onto the 
international stage in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Even since the death of Osama bin 
Laden the group has continued to operate and become stronger.177 The organization 
includes large affiliates in Iraq (al Qaeda in Iraq), Yemen (al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula), North Africa (al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), Somalia (al Shabaab) and 
Syria (al Nusra Front).178 The network “is adaptive, complex, and resilient.”179 Today a 
core group leads the increasingly decentralized network. Formal and informal human 
networks characterize the connections among members.180 There are three main parts of 
the network: the core commanding group based in Pakistan, groups publically recognized 
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as being part of al Qaeda, and “the groups that may not publicly identify as al Qaeda but 
that functionally support the network and have adopted the al Qaeda ideology.”181 
This third category most closely resembles the relationship between groups in the 
Sinai and al Qaeda. Groups in the Sinai not only support the network, but also benefit 
from the logistical support the network provides. There have been reports of the 
establishment of al Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula, but little concrete evidence of its 
existence until recently. In July following the removal of Morsi, the Long War Journal 
reported that a former doctor of Bin Laden, Ramzi Mowafi, was leading “al Qaeda in the 
Sinai Peninsula.”182 He reportedly appeared in Sinai in August 2011 and flyers with the 
name “al Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula” also appeared around the same time.183There 
have not been any official claims of responsibility from this group; it seems likely that 
they are instead providing ideological guidance, logistical support, and funding to local 
Sinai groups.  
ANSAR JERUSALEM, AL QAEDA AND SYRIA 
 
 Evidence has suggested that Ansar Jerusalem may be connected to external jihadi 
networks in two distinct ways: via veterans from Syria and possible connections to the 
Mohammed Jamal Network. Ansar Jerusalem’s connections to veterans of the Syrian 
civil war became clear in October 2013. The group released a video of the September 5 
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assassination attempt on the Interior Minister on jihadi forums.184 In this video, the group 
identified Walid Badr, a former Egyptian army officer, as the suicide bomber who 
targeted Minister Ibrahim.185 The video revealed that Badr had fought against American 
forces in Afghanistan and more recently against the Assad regime in Syria.186 Ansar 
Jerusalem did not identify which groups Badr fought with on these jihadi fronts, however 
al Qaeda had or has a major presence in both. Egyptian news sources have reported that 
other suspects linked to the attack also returned to Egypt from Syria, and were linked to 
al Qaeda’s Syrian arm, al Nusra Front.187 
At least two additional Ansar Jerusalem fighters have reportedly fought in Syria. 
One fighter, Abu Arsalan Saeed al Shahat, detonated a suicide vest in his apartment after 
security forces located him.188  In early March, security forces arrested a suspect in 
January 24 bombings, some of which Ansar Jerusalem carried out, in Cairo who also 
reportedly fought in Syria as well as Libya.189 It is probable that Ansar Jerusalem has 
established ties, or recruited members from amongst Egyptians returning from Syria. 
Syrian veterans can bring a great deal of experience in conducting operations against 
security personnel in addition to weapons and training knowledge. Returnees from Syria 
may also have ties to other international jihadi networks and connections that may 
facilitate the acquisition of weapons and funding.  
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Egyptian news sources have also reported that Ansar Jerusalem, and Walid Badr 
in particular, have ties to the Mohammad Jamal Network (MJN). In 2011 and 2012, al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula allegedly financed a terrorist cell in Egypt.190 The leader 
of the cell was Mohammed Jamal.191 Egyptian security personnel discovered letters 
directly between Jamal and al Qaeda leader, Ayman al Zawahiri.192 Jamal wrote 
Zawahiri, reporting on his activities in Sinai and asking for assistance.193 Jamal reported 
that his network was transporting weapons from Libya into Egypt and setting up training 
camps there.194 Jamal has been in prison in Egypt since November 2012 but his network 
continues to operate. In addition to their ties to violence within Egypt, the network also is 
linked to the September 11, 2012 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya.195 
Recently, Egyptian news sources reported that Badr trained in one of the Jamal 
Network’s training camps, either in Sinai or Libya.196  
It is unclear exactly how closely tied the Mohammad Jamal Network and other al 
Qaeda operatives are to Ansar Jerusalem and other “native” groups. At this point in time, 
it appears that al Qaeda and its network is playing a supporting role in the terror. They are 
providing funding, training and other logistical assistance, but are not directing activities 
on an operational level. Al Qaeda also serves a role as an inspiration for local groups who 
hope to follow in their footsteps.   
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Chapter 7:  The “Why” Behind the Terror 
 
The reason the military has zeroed in on the Brotherhood as the party responsible 
for the terrorist outbreak is fairly clear. They are trying to eliminate their strongest 
political opposition. By declaring the MB to be a terrorist organization the military can 
remove the group from the political sphere without major objections from the 
international community or domestic population. However, their focus on the Muslim 
Brotherhood to the exclusion of the terrorist groups who are directly carrying out the 
attacks and those who support them is extremely problematic. While the military has 
focused on consolidating political control of the country, the terrorists who are actually 
behind the violence have had the opportunity to increase their resources and membership 
and carry out increasingly violent attacks.  
This willful omission ignores the actual perpetrators of the terror and obscures the 
true motivation behind the violence. If the idea that the Brotherhood is behind the terror 
is taken at face value, then the “why” behind the terrorism, and the subsequent solution, 
seems obvious: the expulsion of Morsi is the primary driving force behind the violence 
reinstating him to the presidency would bring an end to their insurrection. Without 
knowing who is carrying out the attacks and why, it is nearly impossible to develop an 
effective counterterror strategy.  
The causes of the terrorism ongoing in Egypt and terrorism throughout the world 
are much more complex than the military argues. To understand the driving factors and to 
answer the ultimate “why” question, we must examine who is carrying out the attacks 
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and what they are trying to accomplish. Although what the terrorists are trying to 
accomplish is not always abundantly obvious, it can be determined from the statements of 
the groups and the targets they seek.  
In Egypt, the primary purpose of the terrorism is to disrupt the military’s actions, 
particularly in the Sinai. The militant groups view the military’s presence in the Sinai as 
fundamentally illegitimate. The groups are targeting the military in order to prevent their 
operations and possibly to force the military out of the Sinai. Ansar Jerusalem has even 
expanded their operations and aspirations well outside the Sinai. This group in particular 
has much more ambitious goals, hoping to bring about the fall of the military government 
or at least significantly limit its ability to function.  
There has been violence in the Sinai since 2011, but it was primarily directed 
towards Israel. Most of the violent attacks were directed towards the gas pipeline to Israel 
or were cross-border attacks targeting tourists or the Israeli Defense Force. There were 
some shootings that targeted Egyptian security personnel but few notable attacks. The 
vast majority of these attacks were fairly simple – they did not require a great deal of 
advance planning or the ability to transport people and weapons through checkpoints. 
These attacks also did not require coordinated timing. The militants were not targeting 
specific personnel; they most often targeted checkpoints that are consistently manned.  
Following the coup that removed Morsi from office, the target of the terrorism 
shifted from Israel to Egyptian security forces. Since 2011, there had been a steady 
stream of attacks on the pipeline to Israel. These attacks came to almost a complete stop 
in the summer of 2013. The targets of the terrorists have been almost exclusively 
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Egyptian security personnel since July 2013 and dozens of police and military officials 
have been killed.  
Ansar Jerusalem has proved itself as the foremost Sinai-based terrorist group by 
carrying out highly complex attacks such as the attempted assassination of Interior 
Minister Mohamed Morsi, the assassination of Interior Ministry official Mohamed 
Mabruk and the bombing of the security directorate in Mansoura on December 24. These 
attacks required the technical knowledge to properly build bombs and the coordination 
and ability to detonate those bombs at the correct moment. Ansar Jerusalem has expanded 
the targets of its violence to include government officials that are working with the 
military. Their goal is not just to expel the military from the Sinai, but also to bring down 
the government.  
Ansar Jerusalem has released a number of public statements that offer an 
interesting insight into the motivations and goals of the group. They have adopted the 
typical al Qaeda ideology, rejecting democracy and secular governance. In addition to 
this overarching motivation, the group has also identified more proximate causes of its 
violence.  
Ansar Jerusalem has over and over again pointed to the actions of the military, 
and the mistreatment of the Egyptian people at its hands as the reason for its attacks. In 
an English version of the statement they released claiming responsibility for the 
September 5 attempt to assassinate Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim, they accused the 
military of a number of crimes:  
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…we have been shocked by what we saw from massacres against the 
ordinary Muslims … and burning of the location with those in it from 
dead and injured, and assaulted the women and children and the 
freewomen of the land of Kinanah were taken to the prisons … and the 
series of assaults continued against the mosques of Rabia, Ramses, 
Alexandria and other and … shelling the houses of Allah in Sinai in a 
blatant attack against everything that relates to Islam.197  
 
The statement continues with a promise to get revenge on the military on behalf of the 
Muslim people.198 Ansar Jerusalem made similar claims in several other statements 
released throughout the fall. They are particularly outraged by perceived crimes against 
women – especially the arrest of female protesters. They point to this as the reason 
behind the assassination of the Interior Ministry official in Cairo in November 2013.199  
Ansar Jerusalem has specifically targeted security personnel and avoided killing 
civilian, several times calling on civilians not to go near security installations.200 It is 
difficult to say how successful they have been in this endeavor, as many reports of attacks 
do not differentiate between civilian and security casualties. Civilians have certainly been 
injured in attacks – at least eleven were wounded in the attempted assassination of the 
Interior Minister – but they have not been targeted. Ansar Jerusalem has even sought to 
minimize casualties of drafted soldiers.201 In a December 2013 statement directed 
towards military personnel, the group asked military conscripts to leave their posts.202 In 
the statement they declared that the entire Egyptian army was non-Muslim (a religious 
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ruling that legitimizes violence against the military) and warned that he who remains in 
the service “only blames himself.”203  
Ansar Jerusalem has issued a critique of democracy,204 but the bulk of their 
attention is focused on the military. They view the military and its actions as 
fundamentally illegitimate and harmful. By launching numerous attacks and specifically 
targeting military installations they are attempting to make it impossible for the military 
to function. They are also trying to convince the population, who has a generally high 
regard of the military, to abandon their support and thereby delegitimize the military’s 
actions. Although they might have a broader goal of eventually establishing an Islamic 
government, their most immediate goal is to disrupt the activities of the military.  
Ansar Jerusalem also sees itself as protecting the population. The group views the 
military and their actions in the Sinai as fundamentally illegitimate and threatening to 
their families. They have taken it upon themselves to defend the population, at first of the 
Sinai and now of Egypt as a whole from the unjust actions of the military. This reasoning 
helps explain why joining Ansar Jerusalem and other terrorist groups might be an 
attractive option for Egyptians. When joining a terrorist group is equated with protecting 
one’s community, it offers a sense of purpose for a frustrated populous.  
Those driven to commit acts of violence may also view the presence of the 
Egyptian military in the Sinai as a sort of foreign occupying power due to the peninsula’s 
longtime alienation from the rest of the country and the military’s absence from the 
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region. As Pape argued, foreign occupation – or in this case – perceived foreign 
occupation can be a powerful motivator for suicide attacks.   
The most recent outbreak of terrorism in the Sinai has a similar pattern of terror to 
other countries, for example Algeria, Yemen and Mali. Where terrorists target domestic 
security forces, their primary goal is to disrupt their operations and delegitimize the 
institution. On an individual level, members are attracted to terrorism because of the 
opportunity to seek defend their loved ones. They feel that both their lives and the lives 
of their families are being threatened. Although the methods and actions are abhorrent, it 
is important to understand the personal motivation behind terrorism. With such a 
powerful appeal to participate in terrorism, it seems unlikely that the terrorists will 
renounce violence anytime soon.   
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Chapter 8:  Conclusion 
 
 Terrorist attacks in the Sinai and the rest of Egypt have continued throughout the 
writing of this project and are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Ansar 
Jerusalem has only grown in strength as the al Qaeda network has gained a foothold in 
Egypt. In an audio message released on April 18, 2014, Ayman al Zawahiri said that, 
“‘We bless every jihadi operation against the Zionists and the Americanized army that 
protects their borders and the criminal of the Interior, and fights the American interests 
that assault the Muslims.’”205 The leader of al Qaeda has taken a strong interest in Egypt 
and has spoken out in support of the terrorists operating there. Evidence suggests that his 
support is not only verbal but also material.  
The al Qaeda network has infiltrated the country and given assistance to the local 
terrorist groups while the Egyptian military has been consolidating their political control 
of the country. Instead of focusing on conducting counterterror operations against Ansar 
Jerusalem and other Sinai-based terror groups, the military has devoted its energy to 
isolating and destroying the Muslim Brotherhood. The military has used the Brotherhood 
as a scapegoat in order to distract the restless population from the real security threat. The 
military has sought to hide the fact that they might not be capable of combatting this new 
terrorist threat and in the meantime the problem has gotten exponentially worse.  
The main underlying cause of the violence is the underdevelopment of the Sinai. 
The government has isolated the region and ignored its residents for decades. Egyptians 
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native to the Sinai have watched while tourist hotels were built along the coast and 
workers from mainland Egypt were brought in to benefit from the tourist industry. The 
rest of the country benefited from economic development while the Sinai governorates 
remained among the poorest. The perceived inequality in development has motivated 
residents to participate in violence.  
It is too late to fix this error of history but it does not mean that the military 
cannot make steps to mitigate the damage. The military can focus on developing the Sinai 
and providing opportunity for its residents in order to give people an alternative to 
violence. Improving the quality of life in the Sinai is the first step to combatting the 
terrorist outbreak. 
Unfortunately, the Egyptian military has very little experience in the Sinai 
Peninsula. They are not familiar with the terrain and do not know how to navigate the 
mountainous desert region. The local population has been marginalized under decades of 
military rule and has no incentive to assist the military in their operations. The military 
has mostly embarked on a collective punishment strategy, arresting hundreds of locals 
after a terrorist attack. This does little to encourage the population to work with the 
military. The military needs to build trust and a working relationship with the people if 
they are going to successfully isolate the Sinai-based terrorists.  
The military must recognize that it is facing another front in the war on al Qaeda. 
They must therefore work to cut off ties between the peninsula and the global al Qaeda 
network. The military also has to develop a better working relationship with the local 
population in the Sinai. This will require both a cessation of collective punishment 
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methods and also providing economic and political opportunities for Sinai residents. The 
military cannot hope to defeat the terrorist threat unless they enlist the local population. If 
they fail to do so, the Sinai Peninsula could become a launching pad for terrorists to carry 
out major terrorist attacks outside of Egypt.   
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